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Abstract
While page views are often sold instantly through
real-time auctions when users visit websites, they
can also be sold in advance via guaranteed contracts.
In this paper, we present a dynamic programming
model to study how an online publisher should op-
timally allocate and price page views between guar-
anteed and spot markets. The problem is challeng-
ing because the allocation and pricing of guaranteed
contracts affect advertisers’ purchase between the
two markets, and the terminal value of the model is
endogenously determined by the updated dual force
of supply and demand in auctions. We take the ad-
vertisers’ purchasing behaviour into consideration,
i.e., risk aversion and stochastic demand arrivals, and
present a scalable and efficient algorithm for the op-
timal solution. The model is also empirically vali-
dated with a commercial dataset. The experimental
results show that selling page views via both guar-
anteed contracts and auctions can increase the pub-
lisher’s expected total revenue, and the optimal pric-
ing and allocation strategies are robust to different
market and advertiser types.
1 Introduction
Display advertising is one of the most popular forms of online
marketing. It uses the Internet and the World Wide Web as an
advertising medium, and when users visit websites, the pro-
motional messages (i.e., the ads), appear on the pages. They
usually come in terms of rectangular images or photos placed
on a web page either above, below or on the sides of the page’s
main content and are linked to other web pages. Online pub-
lishers make profits by selling the page views, namely the im-
pressions, through two channels: (i) selling them in advance
via contracts; or (ii) auctioning them off in real time when users
visit the web pages. The former is called guaranteed contracts
(or reservation contracts) while the latter is called real-time
bidding (RTB). Over the past decades, RTB has become the
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widely used sales model for display advertising, in which ad-
vertisers come to a common marketplace, i.e., ad exchange, to
compete for impressions from their targeted users (Muthukr-
ishnan, 2009; Mansour et al., 2012). It is real-time, impression-
level and auction-based, thus has achieved a significant level of
automation, integration and user-targeting (Yuan et al., 2014b;
Sun et al., 2016).
Although RTB is more widely used, guaranteed contracts in
fact have a longer history. In 1994, wire.com signed four-
teen contracts with companies, such as AT&T, Club Med and
Coor’z Zima, being recognised as the start of display advertis-
ing (DoubleClick, 2005). A guaranteed contract is an agree-
ment and it is usually negotiated privately between a publisher
and an advertiser for bulk sales. Only a small portion of im-
pressions on the market is sold through guaranteed contracts
but they bring in much more revenue than RTB (eMarketer,
2013). In order to meet the demand for automation due to
the huge number of site visits, standardised guaranteed con-
tracts have been recently discussed. This is known as pro-
grammatic guarantee (PG). In essence, PG is a sales system
that sells future impressions via standardised guaranteed con-
tracts in addition to RTB (OpenX, 2013). Examples include
Google DoubleClick’s Programmatic Guaranteed, AOL’s Pro-
grammatic Upfront and Rubicon Project’s Reserved Premium
Media Buys. Recent studies have investigated PG from differ-
ent perspectives and we provide an extensive review in Sec-
tion 2. These studies aim to answer the following two main
questions: (i) how many future impressions should be allocated
to guaranteed contracts? and (ii) how to price the guaranteed
contracts?
In this paper, we use a revenue maximisation model to study
how to sell impressions using RTB and PG. More specifically,
some impressions are sold in advance via standardised guar-
anteed contracts before the delivery day while the rest of the
impressions are auctioned off in RTB using the second-price
auctions (Ben-Zwi et al., 2015). We focus on one ad slot and
study how the estimated total impressions in a future period,
i.e., the ad delivery day, should be allocated and priced algo-
rithmically between guaranteed and spot markets. For exam-
ple, AOL sells the impressions from the top banner of its home-
page on Christmas Day. AOL needs to decide on how many
impressions should be sold a couple of days, weeks or months
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before Christmas via guaranteed contracts and at what prices.
Unlike the traditional way of selling guaranteed contracts, in
our model, there is no negotiation process between the pub-
lisher and the advertiser. Instead, the guaranteed contract price
is posted in a common marketplace. Advertisers can monitor
the price trend over time and purchase the needed impressions
directly at the corresponding prices prior to the delivery day.
Based on auction theory and operations research studies, we
also consider the distinct characteristics of advertisers, i.e., risk
aversion and stochastic arrivals, and then propose an algorithm
to find the optimal allocation and pricing strategy by extending
the solution to the Knapsack problem. The proposed model is
further examined with an RTB dataset from a UK supply-side
platform (SSP).1 Our results show that introducing guaranteed
contacts in addition to RTB increases the publisher’s expected
total revenue. Specifically, for ad slots with a high competition
level, the guaranteed contract price significantly increases over
time and the publisher allocates a large percentage of future
impressions into guaranteed contracts, consequently, the rev-
enue is mainly collected by PG. For ad slots with a low com-
petition level, the guaranteed contract price increases steadily
and less contracts are sold. However, our results show that
the publisher’s revenue from those ad slots can be significantly
increased because there is a greater margin to be optimised.
We further examine the robustness of our model by consider-
ing two extensions: (i) incorporating uncertainty into demand
and supply of the impressions; and (ii) segmenting advertis-
ers based on their valuations. Our analysis shows the model
is robust under different conditions and the publisher can al-
ways obtain a higher total revenue when selling through both
channels.
Our research makes the following contributions. First, differ-
ent from the existing work which focuses on either guaranteed
contracts or RTB, this paper is among the first to introduce a
unified framework that combines PG and RTB simultaneously
in display advertising. Second, we also study the interaction of
pricing and allocation decisions on guaranteed contracts, thus
can provide further insights to the existing literature that only
focuses on either pricing or allocation. Third, different from
the widely used conventional methodologies in marketing and
operational studies, this paper proposes a data-driven analyt-
ical model. Our solution to the revenue maximisation prob-
lem is simple, efficient and scalable. The insights from our
model are further validated using a commercial dataset. The
robustness of the results indicates the potential usefulness of
our model in practice.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
the related literature. Section 3 discusses the model, includ-
ing problem formulation, model assumptions and our solution.
Section 4 describes the used dataset and experimental settings.
Section 5 presents our experimental results and Section 6 con-
cludes the paper.
1Supply-side platforms (SSPs) are intermediaries who help pub-
lishers sell impressions in RTB. Through SSPs, publishers are able to
connect with advertisers from various ad exchanges and networks.
2 Related Work
Our paper focuses on selling impressions via both RTB and
PG, thus it naturally lies in the interface between mechanism
design for online advertising auction and revenue management
with dynamic pricing.
Mechanism design for online advertising has been extensively
studied in the literature. Many discussions have been cen-
tered around search advertising auctions, such as the gener-
alized first-price auction (Edelman et al., 2007), the general-
ized second-price auction (Edelman et al., 2007; Lahaie and
McAfee, 2011; Lahaie and Pennock, 2007; Varian, 2007), the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction (Parkes, 2007; Varian,
2009; Varian and Harris, 2014) and the optimal auction (Feld-
man et al., 2010; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011; Thompson and
Leyton-Brown, 2013) which extends Myerson’s optimal auc-
tion for a single indivisible good (Myerson, 1981). Most of
these studies on advertising auctions examine the properties of
an auction model with respect to incentive compatibility, ex-
pected revenue, individual rationality, and computational com-
plexity. In this paper, we focus on display advertising with
the second-price auction. It has a simplified scenario in auc-
tion mechanism design because: (i) the measurement model is
based on ad display rather than click, so click-through rate is
not a major factor; (ii) ad slots on the same web page for a
single page view is auctioned off separately so that each inde-
pendent auction is a single-item auction.
Our paper is also related to the literature in revenue man-
agement (Bitran and Caldentey, 2003; Talluri and van Ryzin,
2005), in which many studies focus on how a seller uses dy-
namic pricing models to produce or offer a menu of products or
services to its customers. For example, Gallego and van Ryzin
(1994) used intensity control to sell a given stock of products
by a deadline when demand is price sensitive and stochastic
and the seller’s objective is to maximise his expected revenue.
Their model fits many applications such as single-route flight
tickets selling and hotel rooms booking. Anjos et al. (2004,
2005) proposed a dynamic pricing framework for selling flight
tickets under the assumption of static demand. Our problem
setting for PG is similar to the existing literature, however, the
terminal value in our case is uncertain because the remaining
impressions are auctioned off in RTB.
Existing literature has also studied selling products or services
via both auctions and posted prices. For example, Caldentey
and Vulcano (2007) discussed a problem of two channels sell-
ing, where the products can be sold through either an auction
or an alternative channel with a posted price. They considered
two scenarios of this dual-channel optimisation problem: in the
first scenario, the posted price is an external channel run by an-
other company; in the second scenario, the seller manages both
auction and posted price channels. The second scenario is sim-
ilar to our model setting. However, their discussion is mainly
about the static posted price and they assume that the original
values are uniformly distributed and there is no penalty cost.
Gao et al. (2016) studied a hybrid model that unifies both fu-
ture and spot markets for dynamic spectrum access, in which
buyers can purchase under-utilized licensed spectrum either
through predefined contracts or through spot transactions with
a VCG-like auction model. Their work is similar to ours, how-
ever, the seller does not optimise the contract price dynami-
cally.
There are also a number of studies discussing the dual-channel
problem in the context of display advertising. Feldman et al.
(2009) proposed a selection and matching algorithm for dis-
play ads, in their paper, the publisher’s objective is not only
to fulfill guaranteed contracts but also to deliver well-targeted
impressions to advertisers. Ghosh et al. (2009) proposed that
a publisher can act as a bidder to bid for guaranteed contracts
– the allocation of impressions becomes the competition be-
tween the publisher and other advertisers so that impressions
can be allocated to auctions only if advertisers’ bids are high
enough. Roels and Fridgeirsdottir (2009), Salomatin et al.
(2012), Balseiro et al. (2014) and Chen (2017) discussed the
optimal allocation using stochastic control models. Bharad-
waj et al. (2012) proposed a lightweight allocation frame-
work which lets the real servers to allocate ads efficiently and
with little overhead. Chen (2016) investigated the dynamic
reserve prices of guaranteed contracts based on RTB. How-
ever, the model does not give the optimal solution. Hojjat
et al. (2014) discussed an idea in the allocation and serving
of display ads by using predetermined fixed length streams of
ads. Their framework introduces user-level perspective into
the common aggregate modelling of the ad allocation prob-
lem. Zhang et al. (2017) proposed a consumption minimization
model, in which the primary objective is to minimise the user
traffic consumption to satisfy all contracts. Cancellations have
also been discussed in some studies, namely, the publisher can
cancel a guaranteed contract later if he agrees to pay a penalty
(Babaioff et al., 2009; Constantin et al., 2009).
Guaranteed contract pricing has also been discussed in several
recent studies. Bharadwaj et al. (2010) presented two algo-
rithms to compute the price of a guaranteed contract based
on the statistics of users’ visits to the web pages. Najafi-
Asadolahi and Fridgeirsdottir (2014) and Fridgeirsdottir and
Najafi-Asadolahi (2017) used queueing systems and discussed
two different pricing schemes for a publisher who promises to
deliver a certain number of clicks or impressions on the ads
posted, where uncertain demand, traffic and click behaviour
are considered. Wang and Chen (2012), Chen and Wang (2015)
and Chen and Kankanhalli (2018) discussed several pricing
methods for various flexible guaranteed contracts tailored to
display advertising, called ad options. The ideas came from fi-
nancial and real options (Constantinides and Malliaris, 2001).
Simply, if an advertiser pays a small fee to buy an ad option,
he is guaranteed a priority buying right but not an obligation of
his targeted future impressions. He can then decide to pay the
fixed price in the future to advertise.
Our research in this paper concerns both pricing and allocation
so the optimal solution includes and reflects their interaction
effects. Our problem setup is similar to Chen et al. (2014).
However, both the model and the analysis are significantly dif-
ferent from theirs in three important aspects. First, we consider
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Figure 1: Schematic view of the proposed model for display
advertising: [t0, tN ] is the time period to sell the guaranteed
contracts containing the impressions which will be created
in the future period [tN , tN˜ ]; advertisers’ demand of adver-
tising in [tN , tN˜ ] arrives sequentially over time in [t0, tN ];
and the unfulfilled demand will join RTB in [tN , tN˜ ].
stochastic demand for buying guaranteed contracts. We use a
Poisson process to model the arrival of advertisers and allow
unfulfilled demand to be backlogged. While Chen et al. (2014)
assumes the demand for advertising in the future period can be
shifted in advance by using a deterministic exponential decay
function, the unfulfilled demand in their setting is not explicitly
considered at later time points. Second, we devise an optimal
pricing and allocation solution to maximise the publisher’s ex-
pected total revenue, by extending an algorithm for the Knap-
sack problem. Different from Chen et al. (2014) where the
optimal solution is linearly searched, our solution is a greedy
algorithm, and is relatively scalable and efficient. Third, we
further analyse the model’s robustness by incorporating supply
and demand uncertainty and customising optimal pricing and
allocation for different advertiser segments.
3 Model
Fig. 1 presents a schematic view of the model. It demonstrates
how a publisher can sell impressions from a specific ad slot of
a publisher between guaranteed and spot markets. Specifically,
impressions can be sold in advance via standardised guaran-
teed contracts and the remaining impressions will be auctioned
off in RTB when online users visit the corresponding hosting
web page. Let [0, T ] be the selling period of guaranteed con-
tracts and [T, T˜ ] be the period that impressions are created and
auctioned off in RTB. We further use tn, n = 0, 1, · · · , N ,
to denote N equally spaced discrete time points during the
selling period. The relationship between the discrete-time and
continuous-time notations is: t0 = 0, tN = T , and tN˜ = T˜ .
Suppose that the total supply of impressions S in the future
period [tN , tN˜ ] is well estimated, the publisher needs to de-
cide how many future impressions to sell in advance through
guaranteed contracts during [t0, tN ] and what price should be
charged at each specific time point tn prior to RTB. The pub-
lisher’s decision making takes the buying behaviour of adver-
tisers into account. We assume that the total demand of fu-
ture impressions Q can be well estimated but advertisers arrive
stochastically over time prior to the delivery day. For simplic-
ity and without loss of generality, we assume that each adver-
tiser has unit demand (i.e., one impression) so each guaran-
teed contract is a standardised contract only containing a sin-
gle impression. This setting is reasonable because impressions
are auctioned off individually in RTB (Ben-Zwi et al., 2015)
and the setting can be easily extended to bulk sale in practice.
We assume the total demand exceeds the total supply to en-
sure there are competitions among advertisers in the future auc-
tions. Otherwise, no guaranteed contracts would be purchased
in advance because they can obtain the needed impressions at
very low prices or even reserve prices in auctions (Yuan et al.,
2014a). For the reader’s convenience, a notation table is pro-
vided in Appendix A. In our model setting, the publisher’s goal
is to sell S impressions from a specific delivery period toQ ad-
vertisers with unit demand and stochastic arrival to maximise
its revenue. By allowing the publisher to sell these impres-
sions via both guaranteed contract before the delivery period
and RTB in the delivery period, we investigate two decisions
that the publisher needs to make: (i) how to allocate impres-
sions between the two channels? and (ii) how to set the unit
price for the impressions sold via standardised guaranteed con-
tracts at different time points before RTB?
3.1 Stochastic Demand Arrivals and Purchase Behaviour
A distinguishing feature of our model is that we consider
stochastic demand in buying guaranteed contracts. For ease
of exposition, we assume advertisers arrive following a ho-
mogeneous Poisson process with a constant λ.2 Let ∆t =
tn − tn−1 and f(tn) be the expected arrivals in the period ∆t
so f(tn) = λ∆t. Once advertisers arrive, they will last up
to time tN if their demand is not fulfilled, and we normalise
the waiting cost to zero.3 The cumulative expected total de-
2Poisson process is widely adopted in the literature mainly be-
cause of the memoryless property of the exponential inter-arrival dis-
tribution (McGill and van Ryzin, 1999; Aviv and Pazgal, 2008). It
captures the randomness between arrivals and helps us formulate the
dynamic pricing setting for the guaranteed contracts with RTB. Our
model framework can also accommodate other demand arrival pro-
cesses, such as non-homogeneous Poisson process. This may make
the model expression more complicated but the main insights will still
hold, and we believe this is a relatively minor technical concern.
3In our model, we normalise the waiting cost to zero, because the
impressions are all delivered in the same time, i.e., in period [tN , tN˜ ].
We do not consider the case where the advertisers may strategically
delay their purchases to wait for a lower price in future time peri-
ods (prior to the delivery), which will require stronger assumptions
regarding how the advertisers hold beliefs on future prices that they
would pay for guaranteed contracts and RTB, and which cannot be
observed in our dataset. We thus discuss the advertisers’ strategic
mand of buying in advance up to time tN should not be larger
than the estimated total demand in the delivery period, that is,
λ ≤ Q/(∑∆t) = Q/T .
As the auction outcome is uncertain, we assume advertisers are
risk-aware (Radovanovic and Heavlin, 2012; Chen et al., 2014)
and we follow the framework proposed by Anjos et al. (2004,
2005) to assume that a certain percentage of arrived advertis-
ers would like to buy guaranteed contracts. Time and price are
two key factors of an advertiser’s buying decision on the guar-
anteed contract. Therefore, a ratio function θ(t, p(t)) is used
to represent the proportion of those who want to buy an im-
pression in advance at time t and at price p(t), satisfying the
following properties:
θ(t, p) ≥ θ(t, p∗), for 0 ≤ p ≤ p∗, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (1)
θ(t, p) ≥ θ(τ, p), for 0 ≤ τ ≤ t ≤ T, 0 ≤ p, (2)
θ(t, 0) = 1, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3)
Eq.(1) shows that at the same time point, more advertisers are
willing to buy a guaranteed contract when the price is lower;
Eq.(2) indicates that more advertisers are willing to buy a guar-
anteed contract when it is closer to the end of time horizon;
Eq.(3) denotes that all advertisers are willing to purchase a
guaranteed contract when its price is zero. It is worth mention-
ing that the above purchase behaviour assumptions are mainly
for the general rational advertisers without budget constraints.
The guaranteed contract price should not exceed the adver-
tiser’s value on an impression, which will be discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.
Consistent with the existing literature, we formulate
θ(tn, p(tn)) in the following form:
θ(tn, p(tn)) = exp
{
− αp(tn)
(
1 + β(tN − tn)
)}
, (4)
where α represents the price effect and β represents the time
effect. This functional form is widely used in dynamic pro-
gramming with various applications, such as selling flight tick-
ets (Anjos et al., 2005), display advertising (Chen et al., 2014),
and so on.
Based on Eq.(4), the demand for buying a guaranteed contract
at time tn can be computed as follows:
η(tn) = I{n>0}
n−1∑
i=0
f(ti)
n−1∏
j=i
[
1− θ(tj , p(tj))
]
+ f(tn),
(5)
where I{·} is an indicator function,
∑n−1
i=0 f(ti)
∏n−1
j=i
(
1 −
θ(tj , p(tj))
)
computes the unfulfilled demand backlogged
from the previous time periods and f(tn) is the expected num-
ber of advertisers arriving in the current time period.
3.2 RTB-Based Terminal Value
Another distinguished feature of our model is that, the termi-
nal value of this dynamic programming problem depends on
waiting behaviour as a future research topic in Section 6.
the outcome of RTB. In RTB, impressions are usually sold
separately through the seal-bid second-price auction (Ben-Zwi
et al., 2015), and the existing literature has shown that such a
mechanism enables truth-telling, namely, it is a weakly domi-
nant strategy to bid at one’s valuation (Narahari, 2014).
Let ξ be the number of advertisers who enter an RTB cam-
paign, which can be interpreted as the competition level in
RTB. By following the auction literature (Narahari, 2014), the
expected revenue from RTB can be obtained as follows:
φ(ξ) =
∫
Ω
xξ(ξ − 1)g(x)[1− F (x)][F (x)]ξ−2dx, (6)
where x is an advertiser’s bid, Ω is the range of bid, g(·) and
F (·) are the density and cumulative distribution functions, re-
spectively. Therefore, ξ(ξ− 1)g(x)[1−F (x)][F (x)]ξ−2 rep-
resents the probability that if an advertiser who bids at x is
the second highest bidder, then one of ξ − 1 other advertisers
must bid at least as much as he does and all of ξ − 2 other
advertisers have to bid no more than he does. Usually, uni-
form or log-normal distributions are used for g(·) and F (·)
to model the bid distribution (Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011;
Narahari, 2014) and φ(·) can be solved in closed-form if bids
are uniformly distributed. However, neither distribution co-
incides with empirical data on many instances (Chen, 2016;
Chen et al., 2014; Yuan et al., 2014a). Thus, in this paper, φ(·)
will be learned from data and we will discuss this process in
Section 4.
3.3 Censored Upper Bound for Pricing
When making purchase decisions, an advertiser maximises his
utility by comparing the expected costs from guaranteed con-
tract and RTB. Due to the higher risk of RTB compared to PG,
the guaranteed contract price should include a risk premium
which measures the uncertainty or risk that the advertiser fails
to win the RTB campaign. At time tn, the censored upper
bound of the guaranteed contract price can be characterised as
follows:
Φ(tn) = min
{
φ(ξ(tn)) + δ(tn)ψ(ξ(tn))︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=χ(tn,ξ(tn))
, pi
}
, (7)
where pi is the expected maximum value of an impression and
χ(tn, ξ(tn)) is the risk-aware upper bound – it is the sum of
the expected payment in RTB and the risk premium. The risk
premium is operationalised as the multiplication of the stan-
dard deviation ψ(ξ(tn)) of payment prices in RTB and the
advertiser’s risk preference δ(tn). Similar to φ(·), ψ(·) and
pi can be learned from data. And for δ(t), we model it with
an exponential decay function δ(tn) = ζe−vtn so its deriva-
tive δ(t)′ ≤ 0. Here, ζ represents the degree of risk aver-
sion and v represents the time effect. Similar functional forms
have been widely used in asset pricing and risk analysis litera-
ture (Wilmott, 2006). Note that, if N is large, δ(·) ensures that
χ(tN , ξ(tN )) approaches φ(ξ(tN )) when the time is closer to
the delivery day.
3.4 Revenue Maximisation
We next formulate the publisher’s revenue maximisation prob-
lem. Let R be the publisher’s expected total revenue. It con-
sists of the expected revenue from selling impressions through
guaranteed contracts, denoted by RPG, and the expected rev-
enue from auctioning the remaining impressions in RTB, de-
noted by RRTB . Thus, the revenue maximisation problem can
be written as follows:
max R =

N∑
n=0
(1− ω$)p(tn)θ
(
tn, p(tn)
)
η(tn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=RPG
+
[
S −
N∑
n=0
θ
(
tn, p(tn)
)
η(tn)
]
φ
(
ξ(tN )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=RRTB

,
(8)
s.t. 0 ≤ p(tn) ≤ Φ(tn), for n = 0, · · · , N, (9)
0 ≤
N∑
n=0
θ
(
tn, p(tn)
)
η(tn) ≤ S, (10)
where ω is the probability that the publisher fails to deliver a
guaranteed impression, $ is the size of penalty proportional to
the price so that the publisher needs to pay $p(tn) penalty
if he fails to deliver a guaranteed impression which is sold
at price p(tn), and the level of competition in RTB, ξ(tn),
n = 1, · · · , N , can be measured by the average number of
advertisers per impression as follows
ξ(tn) =
Q−∑ni=0 θ(ti, p(ti))η(ti)
S −∑ni=0 θ(ti, p(ti))η(ti) . (11)
In the above revenue maximisation problem, ω, $, Q, S, N
are treated as model parameters so their values are assumed
to be given when we use dynamic programming to solve the
revenue maximisation problem.4 Eq. (9) specifies the bound-
aries of the guaranteed contract price at each time point, and
Eq. (10) ensures the total amount of impressions sold via
guaranteed contracts does not exceed the estimated total sup-
ply S in order to prevent over-selling. The decision variable
p = [p(t0), · · · , p(tN )] is a vector of guaranteed contract
prices which gives the pricing strategy and each p has a corre-
sponding allocation ratio γ representing the percentage of im-
pressions that should be sold via guaranteed contracts. There-
fore, the optimal pricing and allocation strategy can be denoted
by (p∗, γ∗).
3.5 Optimal Solution
The main challenge of solving the publisher’s revenue max-
imisation problem is that RRTB is uncertain because the ac-
tion of selling guaranteed contracts will affect both the sup-
ply and demand of impressions in RTB, which further impacts
4It should be noted that the advertiser pays when he buys a guar-
anteed contract and he can receive the penalty payment from the pub-
lisher if guaranteed impression is not delivered on the delivery day.
Algorithm 1 OPT-R
1: Input: α, β, ζ, η, ω, κ, λ, S,Q, T,N
2: t = [t0, · · · , tN ]; . Initialisation
3: for n← 0, · · · , N do
4: un ← min{S,
∑n
i=0 f(ti)}; . Sales upper bound
5: ln ← ln−1 I{n>0}; . Sales lower bound
6: Yn ← {ln, ln + 1, · · · , un}; . Set of sales at time tn
7: for y ∈ Yn do
8: Hn(y)← OPT-H(α, β, ζ, η, ω, κ, λ, S,Q, T, n, y);
. Algorithm 2
9: if n = N then
10: R(y)← Hn(y) + (S − y)φ
(
Q−y
S−y
)
;
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
14: Output: R∗ ← maxy∈YN {R(y)}; {Hn(y) : n =
0, . . . , N ; y ∈ Yn}
Algorithm 2 OPT-H
1: Input: α, β, ζ, η, ω, κ, λ, S,Q, T, n, y,Hn−1
2: z ← an allocation matrix with size (y + 1)× 2; .
Initialisation
3: j → 1 . Index initialisation of H˜
4: for k ← 1, · · · , (y + 1) do
5: pn,j,k ← Eq. (12);
6: Φn,j,k ← Eq. (7);
7: if pn,j,k > Φn,j,k then . Check price bound
8: Continue;
9: end if
10: H˜n,j(y)← I{n>0}Hn−1(z(k, 1)) + pn,j,kz(k, 2);
11: j → j + 1
12: end for
13: Output: Hn(y)← maxj{H˜n,j(y)};
its expected revenue. Our problem is similar to the Knapsack
problem (Kleinberg and Tardos, 2005), where the optimisation
deals with a sequence of items with values and non-negative
weights. In our problem, prices are affected by the allocation
and they are further censored based on the buying behaviour
of advertisers. As the expected total revenue can be divided
into RPG and RRTB , when the remaining total supply and
demand are given, RRTB can be estimated consequently. So
the optimal RPG can be obtained using the recurrent struc-
ture of dynamic programming. Our solution is presented in
Algorithms 1-2. Algorithm 1 initiates advertisers’ arrivals and
computes the optimal total expected revenue based on different
allocation schemes. For each allocation scheme, Algorithm 2
computes the optimal expected revenue of selling the guaran-
teed contracts. Fig. 2 presents a schematic view of our solution.
In essence, we create a decision tree over time, in which each
node represents a possible scheme of allocation and the corre-
sponding price at a specific time point. The optimal allocation
and pricing strategy is the trial over the tree which maximises
the expected total revenue. Next, we explain a few key steps of
both algorithms in detail.
𝑡𝑛 𝑡𝑁𝑡𝑛−1𝑡0
Figure 2: Schematic view of the proposed optimal solution.
Each node represents a possible scheme of allocation and
pricing of impressions at the corresponding time steps.
As the demand for buying guaranteed contracts arrives follow-
ing a Poisson process, together with Eq. (10), the upper bound
un of total amount of sold impressions up to time tn can be
defined by min{S,∑ni=0 f(ti)}. Its lower bound ln is given
from time tn−1 and l0 is zero. The possible sold impressions
up to time tn can then be generated, denoted by set Yn. For any
y ∈ Yn, its optimal subset-sum can be computed by creating a
(y+ 1)×2 matrix z, which contains all possible combinations
of impressions sold up to time tn−1 and at time tn, such that
z(k, 1) + z(k, 2) = y, for k = 1, · · · , y + 1, and z(k, 1) = 0
if n = 0. Since
z(k, 2)∑n
i=0 f(ti)− z(k, 1)
∝ θ(tn, p(tn)),
the price of a guaranteed contract at time tn can be obtained as
pn,j,k = −
ln{z(k, 2)} − ln
{∑n
i=0 f(ti)− z(k, 1)
}
α
(
1 + β(tN − tn)
) . (12)
We then obtain Φn,j,k by Eq. (7). If pn,j,k > Φn,j,k, the price
pn,j,k will be removed from the solution space and this price
will be replaced with the value calculated by the next index of
k. If pn,j,k ≤ Φn,j,k, we can calculate the corresponding rev-
enue of selling guaranteed contracts up to time tn, denoted by
H˜n,j(y). Then, the maximised revenue of selling guaranteed
contracts up to time tn is obtained, denoted byHn(y). The it-
erations carry on until time tN . For each y ∈ YN , the expected
total revenue can be obtained by adding Hn(y) with the cor-
responding expected revenue from RTB. Finally, the optimal
solution can be obtained by comparing the expected total rev-
enues from all candidates {R(y) : y ∈ YN} in the solution
space. As the optimal selling amount and the corresponding
price of each time step have been stored, we can use the index
of the maximised revenue to obtain the optimal price vector p∗
and the corresponding allocation γ∗. Our solution is a greedy
algorithm and the time complexity is O(NS2), where O is a
notation used to classify algorithms according to how the run-
ning time grows as the input size grows. As N is much less
than S, our solution is relatively scalable and efficient.
4 Data and Experimental Settings
We use an RTB dataset from a UK SSP to validate the proposed
model of selling impressions via both guaranteed contracts and
RTB.5 This dataset contains 1,378,971 RTB campaigns for 31
different ad slots over the period from 08 January 2013 to 14
February 2013. For each ad slot, RTB campaigns range from
7 to 20 continuous days. Therefore, we select the campaign
records of 7 continuous days from all ad slots for experiments.
Given an ad slot, the delivery day [tN , tN˜ ] is randomly selected
and the campaigns reported from this day is used for validation
and testing (called the test set). The records of continuous 6
days prior to the delivery day are used to estimate the model
parameters (called the training set). For those ad slots with
only 7 days data, the 7th day is set to be the delivery day. In
our dataset, all bids in RTB campaigns are quoted in terms of
cost-per-mille (CPM), which is a measurement corresponds to
the value of 1,000 impressions (Yuan et al., 2014b).
The total supply S and demand Q of impressions for a spe-
cific ad slot in the delivery day can be predicted by time series
or regression models. As our primary intention here is not to
discuss a prediction model, Q and S are simply given by the
test set. Fig. 3 summarises the total supply and demand of im-
pressions for ad slots in both training and test sets. There are
5 slots excluded from the original dataset because the compe-
tition level of the slot in RTB is less than 2 in the training set
(i.e., ξ < 2). In such cases, advertisers are able to obtain the
needed impressions in RTB at a very low price or even the re-
serve price. Therefore, it is very unlikely for these advertisers
to buy any guaranteed contracts in advance. Overall, it appears
that the total supply levels are similar across ad slots while
the total demand levels are significantly different. It is worth
noting that, within a day, the competition level ξ varies sig-
nificantly from its mean as many advertisers join RTB at peak
hours between 6 am to 10 am, making ξ on average 118.96%
higher than other hours. In the experiments, we assume guar-
anteed contracts can be sold 31 days prior to the delivery day,
and as discussed in Section 3, the advertiser arrivals follow a
Poisson process during the 31 days. To simplify the discussion
and without loss of generality, intensity λ is set as a constant.
Specifically, 20% of Q is assumed to arrive at time 0 and an-
other 20% ofQ is considered to arrive prior to the delivery day.
Therefore, λ = 0.2Q/30.6
5The dataset has also been used in several recent display advertis-
ing studies (Chen et al., 2014; Yuan et al., 2014a; Chen, 2016).
6Our results with different values for λ show that, consistent with
intuition, smaller (larger) λ leads to less (more) guaranteed contracts
being sold out. However, the main insights from the analysis remain
the same.
We divide 26 ad slots into two groups using the K-Means clus-
tering (Bishop, 2006) based on the competition level ξ in the
training set. Tables 1 presents a brief summary of the major
statistics of both groups. The table shows that, group 1 with
a high competition level has the average 8.92 (in the training
set) and 8.15 (in test set) advertisers bidding per RTB auc-
tion, much higher than those of group 2 with a low competition
level. Consistent with Eq. (6), the average of per-auction pay-
ments of group 1 are also higher than in group 2. Interestingly,
group 2 has a higher average winning bid. By further investi-
gating the distributions of winning bids and payment prices,
we find that the counter-intuitive result is due to the differ-
ent price patterns over two groups, which is demonstrated in
Fig. 4. Fig. 4 uses two examples, slot 24 in group 1 and slot
15 in group 2. For slot 24, the distributions of winning bids
and payment prices are bell shaped, and payment price has a
higher peak and a slightly smaller mean. Differently, for ad
slot 15, the distributions of winning bids and payment prices
are similar to Gaussian mixture distributions (Bishop, 2006),
and payment prices are much lower than winning bids. The
ratio of payment price to winning bid for group 1 is 88.95%
while it is 32.2% for group 2. This suggests that, for ad slots in
the group with a low competition level, there is greater poten-
tial to optimise the selling mechanism to increase the revenue.
Further comparing the training set and the test set in both group
1 and 2, we observe from Table 1 that most statistics are close
and consistent. Thus, it makes sense that we use the training
set to estimate the model parameters, and validate the model in
the test set.
We further use the dataset to estimate parameters φ(ξ), ϕ(ξ)
and χ(t, ξ(t)) when ξ is given, which are visualised in
Fig. 5. Following existing literature (Chen et al., 2014; Chen,
2016), we implement the locally weighted regression scatter-
plot smoothing (LOWESS), polynomial regression, and sig-
mod methods.7 The LOWESS method combines multiple
weighted polynomial regression models (Cleveland, 1979) and
we follow the implementation settings of Algorithm 1 given
in Chen et al. (2014). The sigmod method uses a scaled sig-
mod function to approximate the training data, where the scal-
ing parameters are calibrated based on the root mean squared
errors. Finally, the LOWESS method is selected for parameters
estimation as it fits the training data best. Given time t, δ(t) is
calculated and then χ(t, ξ(t)) is obtained. We set pi as the max-
imum value of average bids (hourly basis) in the training set,
then a surface of the price upper bound Φ(t) is obtained.
5 Results
In this section, we first present our experimental results on the
model’s performance, and then investigate the model’s robust-
ness by considering: (i) the effect of uncertainty in supply and
demand of impressions; and (ii) advertisers with different val-
uations. The robustness analysis can provide insights for daily
7Other statistical or machine learning methods may also be used
here, however, discussing the best prediction method is out of the
scope of this paper.
(a)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
Ad slot ID
0
2
4
6
8
10
 
Q
105
Training
Test
(b)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
Ad slot ID
0
2
4
6
 
S
104 (c)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
Ad slot ID
0
10
20
30
40
50
Figure 3: Summary of the RTB dataset: (a) the total demand; (b) the total supply; (c) the average per impression compe-
tition level.
Table 1: Summary of clustered ad slots, where numbers in round brackets are standard deviations.
Group 1 2
Number of ad slots 6 20
Set Training Test Training Test
Payment price 0.98 (0.09) 0.99 (0.08) 0.73 (0.46) 0.56 (0.36)
Winning bid 1.13 (0.17) 1.1 (0.1) 2.32 (1.17) 1.84 (1.04)
ξ 8.92 (3.24) 8.15 (1.18) 3.39 (0.59) 3.51 (0.81)
Ratio of payment 88.95% 92.88% 32.2% 37.18%
price to winning bid (4.54%) (2.15%) (9.9%) (10.58%)
operations as the two situations may occur in practice.8
5.1 Optimal Pricing and Allocation
To illustrate how the proposed model can optimally price and
allocate impressions between guaranteed and spot markets,
Figs. 6-7 present examples of ad slot 24 from group 1 and ad
slot 15 from group 2. We deliberately show the results of these
two slots because they are typical instances in the correspond-
ing group. Also, as the distributions of wining bids and pay-
ment prices of both slots in RTB have been shown in Fig. 4,
we can clearly see if the optimal prices of guaranteed contracts
are feasible.
Fig. 6 illustrates the optimal pricing strategies suggested by
the model as well as the effects of the advertisers’ risk prefer-
ence (i.e., ζ and v) on the optimal prices of guaranteed con-
tract. Comparing the sub-figures in the same column, we can
see that there is a general trend of price increase over time for
both slots. The price on slot 15 increases more steadily. This is
because there is less demand for buying guaranteed contracts
prior to the delivery day due to the low competition level. Also,
as less advertisers arrive, the price growth is not significant
over time. On the contrary, as it is difficult to obtain impres-
sions in RTB for slot 24 with high competition level, more ad-
vertisers would be willing to secure the impressions in advance
through guaranteed contracts. Consequently, the guaranteed
contracts can be sold at higher prices. This is confirmed by the
observation in Fig. 6 that the price increases steeply and then
be censored by the upper bound Φ(t), which is the minimum
8We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting the extensions in
Sections 5.2-5.3.
value between pi and χ(t, ξ(t)), as defined in Eq. (7). Further-
more, by comparing the sub-figures in the same row, Fig. 6
shows how the advertisers’ risk preference parameters ζ and v
affect χ(t, ξ(t)) and the optimal price. The value of χ(t, ξ(t))
increases significantly with the increase of ζ. Since χ(t, ξ(t))
is an exponential decay function of v, it converges quickly to
φ(ξ(t)) if v increases. The optimal price is more sensitive to v.
However, the impacts of v and ζ on the optimal price is mild.
We next investigate the optimal allocation in Fig. 7. This fig-
ure shows the details of the corresponding optimal allocations
made by the model for the same ad slot and under the same
experimental settings of Fig. 6. Obviously, the model suggests
different allocation strategies for different slots. For slot 24
with high competition level, the model allocates more future
impressions into guaranteed contracts, and they constitute a
large percentage of the expected total revenue. For slot 15 with
low competition level, the model allocates only a small amount
of impressions in advance. As a result, the average payment
price of impressions auctioned in RTB increases significantly,
and the expected total revenue is largely contributed by RTB
rather than PG. Furthermore, Fig. 7 also indicates the effects
of advertisers’ risk preference, ζ and v, on optimal allocation.
First, the proportion of impressions allocated to PG, γ, is de-
creasing in ζ. This is because guaranteed contract prices are
slightly higher if ζ is large so less advertisers would be willing
to buy guaranteed contracts. Second, γ is increasing in v. This
is because if v increases: (i) advertisers are more risk averse
and more sensitive to time; (ii) χ(t, ξ(t)) decreases quickly and
the guaranteed prices will be slightly lower so more advertisers
would be willing to buy in advance.9
9The optimal allocations are same in Fig. 7 (a-2) and (a-4) as well
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Figure 4: Examples of distributions of winning bids and payment prices in the training set: (a) ad slot 24 in group 1; (b)
ad slot 15 in group 2.
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The overall results of the model performance on ad slots of two
clustered groups are summarised in Fig. 8. We compare the ex-
pected total revenue given by the model with both the expected
RTB revenue and the actual RTB revenue. The expected RTB
revenue is calculated by multiplying the average per-auction
payment with the total number of impressions, while the ac-
tual RTB revenue is the total revenue reported by actual RTB
campaigns in the test set.10 Our results show that selling im-
pressions via both PG and RTB indeed increase the total rev-
enue for two groups with different competition levels. With
the increase of ζ, the increase in revenue converges to its max-
imum amount. Furthermore, by comparing the allocation for
group 1 and 2, more impressions are allocated into guaran-
teed contracts in group 1 when the competition level is high,
consequently, the expected total revenue is largely contributed
by guaranteed contracts. However, as mentioned previously
in Table 1, there is greater potential to improve revenue in ad
slots with low competition level, as its average ratio of payment
price to winning bid is only around 30%, compared to 90% for
the ad slots with high competition level. Therefore, if the ratio
as in Fig. 7 (b-2) and (b-4). This because the effects of ζ and v are
not significant in the chosen ad slots under our experimental settings.
In Appendix B, we provide two additional examples to further justify
our analysis.
10This is also called ground truth in machine learning literature.
of payment to valuation11 increases for the ad slots with low
competition level, the revenue increase will be more signifi-
cant, and our numerical analysis shows that in some cases the
expected total revenue can even be doubled.
5.2 Incorporating Uncertainty into Model Updating
We next further investigate the model by considering the ef-
fect of uncertainty in supply and demand. In the model setting,
given a specific ad slot, S and Q are assumed to be well esti-
mated by the forecasting models at the current time t0. How-
ever, they may change over time due to uncertainty.12 As is
shown in Eq.(11), the uncertainty from both the supply or de-
mand will finally impact the model performance through ξ the
per-impression competition level in RTB. For model tractabil-
ity and ease of exposition, we can fix S and just consider the
11The ratio of payment to valuation is equivalent to the ratio of
payment to winning bid in Table 1.
12If we assume they move either up and down separately, their be-
haviour over time can be captured by two multi-step binomial tree or
lattice models (Cox et al., 1979; Chen et al., 2014) and there will be
four different combinations of their estimations at each time step. If
they can either move upwards, downwards, or stay unchanged in a
given time period, their behaviour can be modelled by two multi-step
trinomial tree or lattice models (Boyle, 1986) and there will be eight
different combinations of their estimations at each time step.
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Figure 6: Examples of optimal pricing of guaranteed contracts suggested by the model for: (a) ad slot 24 in group 1 and
(b) ad slot 15 in group 2. Parameters are set differently in the subplots: (1) ζ = 10, v = 0.1; (2) ζ = 10, v = 0.9; (3)
ζ = 90, v = 0.1; (4) ζ = 90, v = 0.9.
random behaviour of Q over time.13 Let Qn+1 be the rest of
total demand in [tN , tN˜ ] estimated at time tn+1 and let Qn be
the rest of total demand estimated at time tn. We can sim-
ply use a random walk structure to update uncertainty in Q
as follows: Qn+1 ← Qn(1 + ε), where  is the uncertainty
level expressed as a percentage and ε is a white noise such that
E[ε] = 0 and var[ε] = 1. In experiments, we set  = 10%.
When the time step moves, the sold impressions are then re-
moved from S and Q accordingly. We then generate a new es-
timate for the rest of demand, update the corresponding model
parameters, and recompute the optimal prices and allocations
of guaranteed contracts for the rest of the days in the selling
period. The iterations will continue until time tN . By updating
the uncertainty, the time complexity becomes O(N3S2).
Fig. 9 compares the optimal prices with and without consider-
ing the uncertainty for ad slot 24 in group 1 and ad slot 15 in
group 2. The results show that uncertainty affects the optimal
prices marginally. The increasing trend of the price over time
remains the same, although there are small fluctuations in price
movement. Table 2 summarises how uncertainty impacts the
optimal allocation and the expected revenue. The results show
that that uncertainty indeed impacts the optimal impression al-
location between PG and RTB and their respective expected
revenues. Such impacts are marginal on the expected revenue,
but can change the allocation significantly.
13The supply of impressions are usually stable with relatively
low uncertainty, as the traffic or the number of visitors to the web
pages are usually predictable. For example, tools like Google An-
alytics (https://analytics.google.com) and SimilarWeb
(https://www.similarweb.com) offer detailed website traffic
estimation service. Lee and Leckenby (1999); Ilfeld and Winer (2002)
have also shown that many popular websites have rather stable traffic
over a short-term period such as week or month.
5.3 Advertiser Segmentation
Advertisers who bid for the same ad slot can have different
valuations on the impressions (Abraham et al., 2013; Sayedi,
2018). As discussed in Section 3.2, truth-telling is a weakly
dominant strategy in RTB. Thus we can segment advertisers
with different valuations based on their bids. For each ad
slot, we use the K-Means clustering to divide the RTB cam-
paigns into two subgroups: subgroup 1 represents impressions
bided by advertisers who have high valuations while subgroup
2 represents impressions with low-value advertisers. Table 3
presents a brief summary of the major statistics of subgroups
of all 26 ad slots. Similar to Table 1, data expresses similar
patterns in both training and test sets so that we can use the
training set to develop prediction and pricing models for the
future impressions in the test set. In group 1 (where slots have
with a high competition level), subgroup 1 has the average 14
advertisers bidding per RTB auction, much higher than that of
subgroup 2. In group 2 (where slots have a low competition
level), subgroup 1’s competition level is 4 or 5, almost double
subgroup 2. The winning bid and the payment price of sub-
group 1 are all higher than those of subgroup 2 because they
are positively correlated with the competition level. One inter-
esting finding is that, in group 1, the ratio of payment price to
winning bid in subgroup 1 is close to subgroup 2, all around
60%. This is because the winning advertisers offer high bids
in most of RTB campaigns of ad slots 23-25 (whose ratios are
around 30%) though the rest three slots in group 1 have the
ratios around 95%.
Fig. 10 presents examples of optimal pricing, allocation and
selling of guaranteed contracts for the subgroups of ad slots 3
and 15. We use ad slot 3 to replace ad slot 24 to represent group
1 because impressions from the latter are all suggested to be
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Table 2: Summary of changes of model allocation and revenue for clustered ad slots, where numbers in round brackets
are standard deviations, where  = 10%.
Group Setting Changes (%)
ζ v γ RRTB † RPG R
1
10 0.1 8.29 (4.44) -19.59 (6.16) 6.64 (4.28) -1.15 (0.46)
10 0.9 2.54 (2.97) -6.84 (10.27) 3.16 (3.43) 0.38 (0.3)
90 0.1 37.72 (19.21) -41.77 (6.79) 23.88 (12.2) -3.58 (0.55)
90 0.9 2.54 (2.97) -6.84 (10.27) 3.16 (3.43) 0.38 (0.3)
2
10 0.1 -8.74 (13.94) -4.33 (23.76) -4.3 (9.4) -3.97 (14.44)
10 0.9 -6.71 (15.18) -1.75 (17.97) -4.59 (9.38) -1.81 (8.96)
90 0.1 -12.72 (16.71) -4.03 (24.15) -6.05 (10.4) -4.94 (13.95)
90 0.9 -6.71 (15.19) -1.74 (17.99) -4.55 (9.39) -1.79 (8.96)
† Ad slot 26 in group 1 is excluded in the computation as the model suggests all impressions to be
sold in advance via guaranteed contracts so its RTB revenue is 0.
sold via guaranteed contracts by our model so it is impossible
for visualising the optimal allocation. Although small price
fluctuations can be seen in some cases, there is a general trend
of price increase over time in both subgroups in both markets.
Impressions with different values are sold at totally different
prices. It is worth emphasising that, in group 1, more high-
valued impressions are encouraged to be sold in advance and
the total revenue is mainly contributed by guaranteed contracts.
This is not only because of the high competition level but also
because advertisers with high valuations have great potential to
accept a high payment price. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 10 (a-
1), price increases quickly and then be censored by the upper
bound.
Fig. 11 summarises the overall results of the model perfor-
mance on the subgroups of all 26 ad slots. Fig. 11 (a-3) shows
the average γ of subgroup 1 in group 1 is about 95%, further
confirming the replacement of ad slot 24 in Fig. 10. The per-
formance metrics of the model are close for the rest of cases:
(i) low-valued impressions in group 1; (ii) high-valued impres-
sions in group 2; (iii) low-valued impressions in group 2. The
extreme high revenue increase in Fig. 11 (d-1) is due to several
outliers and we further explain the reason in Fig. 12. We use
the LOWESS method to fit the ξ − φ relationship and use the
fitted φ to compute the expected RTB revenue for benchmark
as well as for optimisation. As shown in Fig. 12, the estimated
φ is smaller than the average payment in the real data. There-
fore, the expected RTB revenue is smaller than the actual RTB
revenue, which then gives extremely high revenue increases on
several ad slots.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a novel way of selling display adver-
tising impressions via both guaranteed contracts and RTB. We
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Figure 9: Examples of optimal pricing of guaranteed contracts suggested by the model by adding 10% uncertainty level
( = 0.1) for: (a) ad slot 24 in group 1 and (b) ad slot 15 in group 2. Parameters ζ = 10, v = 0.1.
take into account the buying behaviour of advertisers, i.e., risk
aversion and stochastic arrivals, and employ dynamic program-
ming to solve the publisher’s optimal pricing and allocation
strategy to maximise the expected revenue. Our optimal so-
lution extends the algorithm for the Knapsack problem, and
is relatively scalable and efficient. We further validate the re-
sults using a commercial RTB dataset. The experimental re-
sults show that, selling via both guaranteed contracts and RTB
can significantly improve the publisher’s total revenue. Fur-
thermore, for impressions from ad slots with a high compe-
tition level, a large percentage of future impressions should
be sold in advance via guaranteed contract, and for impres-
sions from ad slots with a low competition level, the revenue
is largely collected by RTB. However, their revenue increases
are more significant. This is mainly due to the fact that adver-
tisers pay much less than their valuations in RTB which gives
more margins for PG to increase the revenue. In addition, the
experimental results show that our model is robust under sup-
ply or demand uncertainty and when advertisers have different
valuations on the impression.
There are several points to be noted here. First, due to the
complex nature of combining both channels, we focus on a
simplified model setup in the paper, while keeping the major
features of guaranteed contracts and RTB. Our model setup can
be relaxed to the case when there are multiple separate groups
of impressions with different delivery time periods. For in-
stance, the impressions from one ad slot on a specific day can
be treated as a separate group, then for each group, our model
can be applied. Therefore, an advertiser can buy impressions
from the same ad slot with different delivery time separately.
Second, we discuss a simple standardised guaranteed contract,
in which the advertiser has no further control of advertising de-
livery in the delivery period. This setting is consistent with the
exiting literature as reviewed in Section 2. It is possible that
Table 3: Summary of clustered subgroups of ad slots, where numbers in round brackets are standard deviations.
Set
Training Test
aaaaaaaGroup
Subgroup
1 2 1 2
Payment price
1 1.17 0.65 1.16 0.62(0.12) (0.34) (0.12) (0.4)
2 1.09 0.16 1.03 0.2(0.61) (0.07) (0.62) (0.09)
Winning bid
1 2.63 1.0 2.62 0.99(1.45) (0.04) (1.49) (0.03)
2 3.25 0.62 3.36 0.53(1.48) (0.22) (2.03) (0.2)
ξ
1 14.39 5.94 14.86 5.53(5.26) (2.7) (6.39) (2.91)
2 4.1 2.61 5.17 2.71(1.04) (0.48) (2.25) (0.74)
1 61.98% 63.16% 63.69% 61.59%Ratio of payment (31.56%) (32.63%) (34.23%) (39.75%)
price to winning bid 2 38.15% 28.4% 42.51% 35.07%(19.19%) (10.33%) (25.96%) (11.69%)
an advertiser would like to gain further control of advertising,
e.g., deciding when to advertise in the future delivery period.
Flexible guaranteed contracts like ad options would be suit-
able choices (Chen et al., 2015; Chen and Wang, 2015; Chen
and Kankanhalli, 2018). However, in these studies, the authors
only investigate the contract pricing but not both allocation and
pricing. Also, the ad option pricing models discussed in those
studies are not optimal. Developing a new revenue maximisa-
tion model for optimal pricing and allocation of ad options can
be a very interesting future topic. Third, when guaranteed con-
tracts are sold, how to prioritise the contracts in the delivery
period is not discussed in our paper. This is a different prob-
lem that is out of the scope of our study because our model
focuses on the sales framework (i.e., the optimal allocation of
the future inventories into two channels and the corresponding
optimal guaranteed contract prices). In the delivery period, the
publisher can give equal priority to the guaranteed contracts or
prioritise some contracts based on the pre-sold guaranteed con-
tract price or other metrics (Feldman et al., 2009; Ghosh et al.,
2009). Finally, our model simplifies the advertiser’s behaviour
and decision by using a ratio that represents the proportion of
those who want to buy an impression, and we do not explicitly
model the advertisers’ strategic behaviour of deliberation over
PG and RTB, as well as the option of leaving the market. Fu-
ture research could model the strategic behaviour of advertisers
using a utility function (Su, 2007; Aviv and Pazgal, 2008), and
study how such a strategic behaviour impacts the publisher’s
optimal pricing and allocation decisions.
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Figure 11: Overall results of the model performance on ad slots in: (a) subgroup 1 of group 1 ; (b) subgroup 2 of group
1; (c) subgroup 1 of group 2; (d) subgroup 2 of group 2. The sub-plots show: (1) the average revenue increase of the
model to the expected RTB; (2) the average revenue increase of the model to the actual RTB; (3) the average ratio of selling
impressions in advance made by the model; (4) the average ratio of payment to valuation made by the model.
1 2 3 4 5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
()
(a)
1 2 3 4 5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
()
(b)
Real data
LOWESS
RTB (real data)
RTB (LOWESS)
Figure 12: Examples of φ(ξ) estimation for subgroup 2 of: (a) ad slot 14; (b) ad slot 19.
Appendix A Notations
This appendix is not an essential part of the paper but may help readers reference the key notations used throughout the paper.
Table 4: Summary of the key notations
Notation Description
t0, · · · , tN , tN˜ Discrete time points: [t0, tN ] is the period to sell the guaranteed contracts; [tN , tN˜ ] is the period that
the impressions are created, auctioned off (in RTB) and delivered.
Q Estimated total demand for impressions in [tN , tN˜ ].
S Estimated total supply of impressions in [tN , tN˜ ].
RPG Expected revenue from selling guaranteed contracts.
RRTB Expected revenue from selling the remaining impressions in RTB.
p(tn) Price of a guaranteed contract sold at time tn, n = 0, · · · , N .
γ Ratio of allocation of impressions into guaranteed contracts.
ω Probability that the publisher fails to deliver a guaranteed impression in [tN , tN˜ ].
$ Size of penalty so the publisher needs to pay $p(tn) penalty if he fails to deliver a guaranteed
impression which is sold at p(tn).
η(tn) Total (accumulative) arrived but unfulfilled demand at time tn.
θ(tn, p(tn)) Proportion of advertisers who are willing to buy an impression in advance at time tn and at price
p(tn).
α Price effect in θ(tn, p(tn)).
β Time effect in θ(tn, p(tn)).
δ(tn) Risk preference for a buyer at time tn.
ζ Risk level in δ(tn).
v Time effect in δ(tn).
ξ(tN ) Per-auction competition level of RTB in [tN , tN˜ ].
φ(ξ(tn)) Expected payment from an impression in RTB for the given ξ(tn).
ψ(ξ(tn)) Expected risk of an impression in RTB for the given ξ(tn).
χ(tn, ξ(tn)) Risk-aware upper bound of the guaranteed contract price at time tn.
Φ(tn) Censored upper bound of the guaranteed contract price at time tn.
pi Expected maximum value on an impression.
λ Intensity of the Poisson process describing the demand arrivals.
f(tn) Expected number of arrivals in [tn−1, tn].
O Execution time required by an algorithm.
E[·] Expectation.
var[·] Variance.
g(·) Density function of advertiser’s bid.
F (·) Cumulative distribution function of advertiser’s bid.
un Sales upper bound at time tn in Algorithm 1.
ln Sales lower bound at time tn in Algorithm 1.
Yn Set of sales at time tn in Algorithm 1.
H˜n(y) R
PG when selling y guaranteed contracts up to time tn in Algorithm 2, y ∈ Yn.
Hn(y) Optimal RPG in Algorithms 1-2, y ∈ Yn.
R(y) Total revenue of selling y guaranteed contracts up to time tn in Algorithm 1, y ∈ Yn.
Appendix B Examples of Optimal Pricing and Allocation
Here we provide two additional examples to justify our analysis in Section 5.1. Fig. 13 shows examples from ad slot 7 where the
effects of ζ and v on optimal allocation are significant while Fig. 14 shows examples from ad slot 11 where their effects are not
significant.
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Figure 13: Examples for ad slot 7: (a) optimal pricing; and (b) allocation of guaranteed contracts. Parameters are set
differently in the subplots: (1) ζ = 10, v = 0.1; (2) ζ = 10, v = 0.9; (3) ζ = 90, v = 0.1; (4) ζ = 90, v = 0.9.
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